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AN EVALUATION OF THE SEC'S PERFORMANCE - A PRODUCT
OF LEADERSHIP
Robert A. ORBEN

*

During the past fifty years, the SEC's accounting and financial reporting performance and
effectiveness depended to a large extent on the individuals who served as Chief Accountant and
Director of CorporationFinance. The years under Andrew Barr were characterized by the establishnent of rules and regulations in accounting and auditing matters.
The five years that followed Sandy Burton's appointment were marked by change. New rules were
developed, including disclosure of replacement costs, and expansion of income tax disclosure.
The current period, under ClarenceSampson, has been a period of integration and standardization
of rules. A number of deregulatory actions in the accounting area have evinced the tendency of the SEC
to work with the FASB and the accounting profession.

1. Introduction

An equitable evaluation of the SEC's accounting and financial reporting
performance and effectiveness during the past fifty years is largely dependent
on an understanding of the regulatory environment which has prevailed and
the leadership attributes of several individuals who have served as Chief
Accountant and Director of Corporation Finance. Accordingly, as a preparer

of financial statements for a U.S. public corporation, I have elected to develop
my observations by reflecting on the activities of the Office of the Chief
Accountant during three different periods. These are the first thirty-five years
of the SEC, the following five years and the last eight years. I shall conclude by

providing some thoughts on the current environment and opportunities for the
SEC's continued effectiveness over the next decade.
2. History of the Office of the Chief Accountant and Office of Corporate
Finance (1936-71) - the era of Andrew Barr and others
With the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Congress
established the SEC and empowered it to mandate suitable accounting reports
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and principles [1]. Administration of the 1933 Act, which had been assigned
initially to the Federal Trade Commission, was also made the responsibility of
the SEC [2]. So, in response to the legislation, the SEC began operations and
the Office of the Chief Accountant was responsible for establishing rules and
regulations in matters of accounting and auditing [3]. Thereafter followed the
development and adoption of the Commission's accounting and disclosure
rules. Among those are Regulation S-X which covers the form and content of
financial statements [4] and a number of accounting series releases (ASR),
including ASR 4 which outlined, as early as 1938, the administrative policy for
financial statements [5]. Right or wrong, the initial rules of the SEC were
developed to fill a void in the professional literature and to minimize alleged
reporting abuses. Specifically, during this period, the Accounting Principles
Board (APB) issued less than approximately seventeen standards which addressed the form and content of financial statements, thus yielding by default
to the SEC and Regulation S-X for authoritative guidance on these matters.
In this initial thirty-five year period, Andrew Barr served as Chief Accountant and the profession viewed the accounting and disclosure rules developed
by the SEC as generally reasonable and well thought out. It was also a period
in which the SEC purposely promulgated more accounting rules than it might
have otherwise.
During this same thirty-five year period, the Division of Corporation
Finance got underway and began the process of enforcing the accounting rules.
To many, the level of enforcement was somewhat burdensome; however, the
SEC is more reasonable and less bureaucratic in comparison to other government agencies.

3. The next five years (1972-77) - the Sandy Burton era
When Sandy Burton assumed the Chief Accountant's post in 1972, the
APB's standards-setting process was under severe challenge; historical cost and
marginal disclosure practices were being attacked. So were almost all of the
accounting concepts on which financial reporting was based. Consequently,
Sandy Burton sensed that a change was necessary and warranted, and that the
standards-setting process was not proceeding at an acceptable pace.
So, change followed quickly and the SEC rules multiplied significantly. For
example, it was during this period that Accounting Series Release (ASR) No.
190, requiring disclosure of replacement costs, was issued [6]. Line of business
reporting was also mandated [7] and preferability letters from registrants'
public accountants became necessary for accounting changes [8]. This proliferation of rules during the Sandy Burton era reflected the tendency to change for
the sake of change, and the belief that more and different is by definition
better.
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During this same period, Stanley Sporkin directed the Commission's enforcement division. Under his leadership the SEC promoted corporate responsibility and morality. Additional disclosure rules were adopted, specifically
those relating to audit committees and disagreements with accountants [9].
Enforcement actions were also initiated against companies who had made
"'questionable" payments [10].
Thus, this era of activity by the SEC staff, as encouraged by the Commission, was one of high impact and visibility. It was also the product of two
determined personalities. By seeking change aggressively, Burton set the stage
for Sporkin's new disclosure rules and enforcement activities.
While the Andrew Barr era had been one of "filling a void and putting meat
on the bones," the Sandy Burton era challenged the standards-setting process,
took broad initiatives, adopted far-reaching disclosure requirements, and put
the SEC Chief Accountant's office clearly on the map. Both eras were
effective; it was, however, the personality of the leadership which established
the nature of the contribution.
To those of us who were preparers of financial statements, we struggled with
the unrelenting disclosure requirements proliferated under Sandy Burton. In
retrospect, it is now clear that we profited from a legitimate re-evaluation of
time-honored reporting concepts and from an improved focus on the needs of
investors. While the pendulum may have swung more than necessary during
the Sandy Burton era, many of the accounting standards and disclosure
requirements which the SEC implemented then have strengthened the financial
reporting of public corporations in the United States. They have, in turn,
enhanced the credibility of financial statements universally.

4. The most current period (1975-85) - the Clarence Sampson era
It is usually easier to evaluate the effectiveness of more recent times.
Consequently, we relate to the Clarence Sampson era without difficulty. On
balance, the last ten years have been a period of fairly stable activity with the
leadership emphasizing modernization and the dedication of resources to rule
integration. In addition, the SEC has reinforced the role of due process in
making changes to reporting requirements. It has also encouraged and supported the standard-setting process in the private sector.
Specifically, the Commission has addressed the long overdue integration
process [111. Under this program, most of the SEC's forms and rules were
subject to a very thorough house-cleaning. Unnecessary rules, such as Regulation S-X's provisions that duplicated generally accepted accounting principles, were eliminated [12], and rules were standardized for most filings with the
Commission [13]. Other actions included the integration of shareholders'
reports [14], adoption of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
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statements as SEC accounting rules [15], and a simplified standardized requirement for the disclosure of the ratio of earnings to fixed charges [16].
Separately, the Commission and Clarence Sampson have supported the
FASB and have exercised accounting oversight responsibility in a prudent
manner. Indeed, SEC action on accounting and disclosure matters has been
initiated only vhen the FASB has not acted on a timely basis or the profession
has failed to stand up to client pressure [17].
During this period, the Commission also undertook a number of deregulatory actions in the accounting area. Many of these were taken in response to
FASB actions; others resulted from consultations with members of the
accounting profession in an effort to develop self-regulatory practices. For
example, the Commission adopted Safe Harbor Rules to protect those who
provided earnings projections or other soft data in registration statements [18].
During this era, the Division of Corporation Finance has functioned fairly
smoothly. Most preparers of financial statements are highly dependent on
Corporation Finance when a registration is being processed. Thus, the contact
is not a regular one; but it is, nevertheless, one where time is of the essence. By
and large, Corporation Finance has consistently been sensitive to registrants'
time constraints without sacrificing investors' interests. It has remained
determined to ensure that prospective investors are provided with sufficient
information on which to judge the merits of their investment. Although
working with a small staff, the division has been available and responsive and,
in turn, has kept the registration process moving smoothly.
By and large, during the Sampson era, the SEC has acted responsibly.
Filings are generally processed efficiently and on a timely basis. The Commission's personnel are dedicated and, for the most part, reasonable.

4. Reflection on the past fifty years
The effectiveness of the SEC during the last fifty years has been characterized, so far, by relating the SEC's staff activities to specific personalities.
Although our verdict has been positive, there are some areas where the SEC's
activities are worthy of further reflection.
The universe of preparers of financial statements is large, complete with a
diverse group of well-meaning professionals who work closely with their
independent accountants and audit committees. Understandably, this universe
is not perfect. Thus, there will be some differences of opinion on how to
account for and report select items. Many of the differences are the product of
how an individual views his or her "own turf' and what is representative for
his or her situation. Therefore, several preparers of financial statements have
expressed concern about the role of the SEC staff in imposing their judgment
over management and independent accountant decisions in subjective areas.
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This role has extended to the establishment of reserves [19] and has imposed
the inclusion of irrelevant financial statements in registration statements, such
as historical financial statements of development stage companies with no
significant operations and insignificant assets and liabilities [201.
There have been at least two areas in which preparers have been at odds
with the SEC, but there are others as well. One host of differences relates to
current topical issues. Still another derives from the opportunities the SEC
needs to face in order to remain an effective and responsible organization in
the future.
Differences rooted in current reporting and disclosure concerns include
items familiar to all of us. For example, the requirement that additional
quarterly Form 10Q disclosures include operating results by industry segment
and geographical distribution of assets has been controversial. Many believe
that the SEC proposed these disclosure requirements in response to some
implied need by certain members of the financial analysts' community. It
could be argued, however, that broad and wholesale disclosure programs have
not been thoroughly thought out and have sometimes been ill-conceived.
Furthermore, the elevation of the authority of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issue papers to that of financial
accounting standards is controversial [21]. Although it is understood that in
many cases the AICPA issue papers are the only published documents dealing
with a particular problem, many have observed that these papers should not be
regarded as providing the same authority of generally accepted accounting
principles. The fundamental purposes of AICPA issue papers is to call attention to accounting and reporting issues that need to be clarified or addressed
by the FASB. While they may contain recommendations, the issue papers have
not been subjected to traditional due process procedures and may not reflect
either consensus or the best solution. In addition, preparers of financial
statements and public accountants are sometimes unaware of these papers.
Along these same lines, preparers of financial statements are concerned
about the SEC's increasing tendency to expand or change disclosure rules
through judicial interpretations which lead to further ambiguities and inconsistencies [221. For example, rules governing insider trading are being extended
through legal proceedings rather than administrative ones [231. As a result,
administrative rule-making procedures are pre-empted and interested parties
do not have the opportunity to participate in the rule-making process.
There is also a perception that the SEC prefers the use of a "shotgun"
solution to problems. For example, the SEC requires all registrants to disclose
information which may be meaningless for the vast majority. Working directly
with registrants who share specific problems or requiring disclosure in more
restrictive circumstances, would be more effective. On balance, however,
preparers of financial statements feel very good about the SEC's recent
performance and its responsiveness.
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5. Conclusion and recommendations
Overall, I believe the investor and the investment community are now better
informed because of capable, effective, and responsive leaders in the Office of
the Chief Accountant and Director of Corporation Finance. In closing, however, I shall point out several emerging opportunities which warrant active SEC
leadership throughout the 1980s.
The recently announced Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval
System (EDGAR), if successful, offers the potential for increased efficiency
through electronic data-gathering, retrieval and mechanized analysis of financial data and filings. This project needs encouragement.
Another controversial development relates to the so-called "integrated"
disclosure system, which has reduced the time and effort that preparers must
spend on filings [24]. The system has resulted in a document which many
preparers of financial statements believe is entirely too detailed for a significant portion of the shareholder population. Therefore, several experiments
have been encouraged in order to determine whether a "summary report"
could be a responsive substitute to the Annual Report [25].
The experiments have proceeded very satisfactorily. Regrettably, the experiments cannot be extended without relaxation of the proxy rules. To date, the
SEC staff has listened attentively, but has not provided any support for proxy
rule relaxation. Personally, I feel the summary reporting opportunity offers too
many benefits to warrant dismissal. The SEC staff need to embrace the
experiment and position themselves as responsive leaders in encouraging this
effort in the 1980s.
As a preparer of financial statements, I believe the United States is
fortunate to have such a fine, committed, responsive group of professionals at
the SEC. Overall, the SEC staff has been extremely effective in carrying out
their charter responsibilities as provided in the Exchange Act of 1934. I am
confident that the past can set the precedent for the future so long as we work
together on issues of mutual interest.

Notes
[1] Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1934).
[2] Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 210, 15 U.S.C. § 78ii (1934) omitted.
[3] See IL Chatov, Corporate Financial Reporting 102-03 (1975). The Office of Chief
Accountant was not included in the SEC's initial organization. Carman G. Blough joined the SEC
as a financial analyst on December 1, 1934. In 1935, Blough became the first SEC Chief
Accountant. Id.
[4 Accounting Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1984).
[5] SEC Accounting Series Rel. No. 4, Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting Principles and Standards (April 25, 1938) [hereinafter cited as ASR 4].
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S-X Requiring Disclosure of Certain Replacement Cost Data (March 23. 1976) [hereinafter cited
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[71 See, e.g., SEC Accounting Series Rel. No. 279. Amendments to Annual Report Forms.
Rules. Regulations, and Guides. Integration of Securities Acts Disclosure Systems (Sept. 2. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as ASR 2791.
[81 SEC Accounting Series Rel. No. 177. Notice of Adoption of Amendments to Form 10-Q
and Regulation S-X Regarding Interim Financial Reporting (Sept. 10. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
ASR 177].
[9] See, e.g., SEC Accounting Series Rel. No. 165. Notice of Amendments to Require
Increased Disclosure of Relationships Between Registrants and Their Independent Public
Accountants (Dec. 20. 1974).
[101 See, e.g., SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 95.509 (D.D.C.
1976).
[11] See. e.g.. SEC Accounting Series Rel. No. 306. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System
(March 3. 1982).
1121 SEC Accounting Series Rel. No. 280, General Revision of Regulation S-X (Sept. 2. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as ASR 280]; SEC Accounting Series Rel. No. 286, New Interim Financial
Information Provisions and Revision of Form 10-Q for Quarterly Reporting (Feb. 9. 1981).
[131 SEC Accounting Series Rel. No. 281, Uniform Instructions as to Financial Statements Regulation S-X (Sept. 2. 1980).
[14] See ASR 279. supra note 7.
[151 See ASR 4. supra note 5; ASR 280, supra note 12.
1161 Accounting Regulation S-K. 17 C.F.R. § 229.503 (1984).
(17] For the Commission's position on this point, see ASR 280, supra note 12. An example of
this position is the imposition of a requirement to classify preferred stock which is subject to
mandatory redemption, or whose redemption is outside the control of the issuer, outside of the
shareholder's equity section of the balance sheet. See also SEC Accounting Series Rel. No. 268.
Presentation in Financial Statements of "Redeemable Preferred Stocks" (July 27, 1979) (proposing
that interim segment data be disclosed quarterly in Form 100 after the FASB dropped its project
on interim financial statements); ASR 177, supra note 8.
[18] A safe harbor mechanism is designed to recognize that if certain data, such as forecast or
inflation information, have a reasonable underlying basis, and are prepared with reasonable care
and in good faith, the data do not constitute "an untrue statement of material fact" or a
"manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent device." This is designed to encourage management to
present meaningful user information without fear that such prospective data will subject them to
unreasonable liabilities under the securities laws. See, e.g., ASR 190, supra note 6.
[19] Financial Reporting Rel. No. 20, Disclosures Concerning Reserves for Unpaid Claims
and Claim Adjustment Expenses of Property Casualty Underwriters (Nov. 27, 1984).
[20] Accounting Regulation S-K. 17 C.F.R. § 229.301 (1984).
[211 See, e.g.. SEC Staff Accounting Bull. No. 58.
[221 See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 103 S.Ct. 3255 (1983) (Rule 10b-5 is violated when tippee assumes
a fiduciary duty to shareholders not to trade on inside information when insider has breached his
or her fiduciary duty by disclosing information to tippee and tippee knows or should have known
of the breach).
[231 Id.
[24] See ASR 279. supra note 7.
[25] These efforts have been spearheaded by the Financial Executives Institute. Committee on
Corporate Reporting.
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